WASHINGTON — The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight year conflict "will likely result in failure," according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal said emphatically: "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) - while Afghan security capacity matures - risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible." His assessment was sent to Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Aug. 30 and is being reviewed by President Barack Obama and his national security team.
McChrystal concludes the document's five-page Commander's Summary on a note of muted optimism: "While the situation is serious, success is still achievable."
But he repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.
McChrystal's assessment is one of several options the White House is considering. His plan comes after leading Democratic lawmakers have expressed reluctance about committing more troops to the war. Obama said last week that he would not decide whether to send more troops until he has "absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be."
The commander has prepared a separate, detailed request for additional troops and other resources, but defense officials have said he is awaiting instructions before sending it to the Pentagon.
McChrystal makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents or controlling territory. "(I)nadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced," he said.
The assessment also offers a critique of the failings of the Afghan government, contending that official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known.
"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal said.
The result has been a "crisis of confidence among Afghans," he wrote. "Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents."
McChrystal is equally critical of the command he has led since June 15. The key weakness of ISAF, he says, is that it is not aggressively defending the Afghan population. "Preoccupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us - physically and psychologically - from the people we seek to protect.
...The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves."
McChrystal continues: "Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population."
In a four-page annex on detainee operations, McChrystal warns that the Afghan prison system has become "a sanctuary and base to conduct lethal operations" against the government and coalition forces. He cites as examples an apparent prison connection to the 2008 bombing of the Serena Hotel in Kabul and other attacks. "Unchecked, Taliban/Al Qaeda leaders patiently coordinate and plan, unconcerned with interference from prison personnel or the military."
McChrystal outlines a plan to build up the Afghan government's ability to manage its detention facilities and eventually put all such operations under Afghan control, including the Bagram Theater Internment Facility, which the United States runs.
For now, because of a lack of capacity, "hundreds are held without charge or without a defined way-ahead. This allows the enemy to radicalize them far beyond their pre-capture orientation. The problem can no longer be ignored."
The general said his command is "not adequately executing the basics" of counterinsurgency by putting the Afghan civilians first. "ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army," he wrote. "Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages."
He also said that coalition forces must change their operational culture, in part by spending "as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases." Strengthening Afghans' sense of security will require troops to take greater risks, but the coalition "cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people."
McChrystal warns that in the short run, it "is realistic to expect that Afghan and coalition casualties will increase."
He proposes speeding the growth of Afghan security forces. The existing goal is to expand the army from 92,000 to 134,000 by December 2011. McChrystal seeks to move that deadline to October 2010.
Overall, McChrystal wants the Afghan army to grow to 240,000 and the police to 160,000 for a total security force of 400,000, but he does not specify when those numbers could be reached.
McChrystal says the military must play an active role in reconciliation, winning over less-committed insurgent fighters. The coalition "requires a credible program to offer eligible insurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection," he wrote. Coalition forces will have to learn that "there are now three outcomes instead of two" for enemy fighters: notonly capture or death, but also "reintegration."
The report repeatedly states that troops must be bolstered if failure is to be averted. "ISAF requires more forces," he said, citing "previously validated, yet un-sourced, requirements" - an apparent reference to a request for 10,000 more troops originally made by McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan.
McChrystal concludes: "The insurgents control or contest a significant portion of the country, although it is difficult to assess precisely how much due to a lack of ISAF presence."
Toward the end of his report, McChrystal revisits his central theme: "Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure." Information for this article was contributed by Josh Boak and Evelyn Duffy of The Washington Post.
Front Section, Pages 1, 4 on 09/21/2009