On Nov. 27, 1978, the Shah of Iran and Empress Farah hosted a luncheon at the Nivavran Palace in Teheran. In attendance were U.S. Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Mrs.Byrd; U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan and Mrs. Sullivan, and myself, in my capacity as advisor to the majority leader on foreign and defense policy.
President Carter had asked the majority leader to meet with the shah and others to assess the situation in Iran, which, by the time we arrived, was increasingly chaotic. Carter was known as a champion of human rights, but he had earlier referred to the shah's Iran as an island of stability in a sea of turmoil -- in the face of mounting dissatisfaction with the shah's authoritarian rule. This tumult had led to riots, mass demonstrations, strikes, bonfires in the streets, resulting in the imposition of martial law.
Before departing from Washington for Iran, Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had urged Byrd to tell the shah the president and Congress stood behind him and were "unequivocal in our support." Brzezinski said Byrd should tell the shah to take his case directly to the Iranian people by radio and television.
Upon our arrival at the Embassy in Teheran, we talked well into the night about what approach Byrd should take with the shah. Ambassador Sullivan said the U.S. continued to support the shah and believed he would prevail, but warned that the situation was unpredictable. We had a serious exchange about how far the United States should go in encouraging the shah and whether he was capable of saving the situation.
We were also mindful that the shah's critics were calling him a U.S. "puppet" at a time when there was a rising tide of nationalism in Iran. The Nixon administration, during the early 1970s, had particularly close ties with the shah, allowing him to purchase vast quantities of sophisticated military equipment, although some in this country strongly cautioned against that cozy relationship.
As a result of all the discussion, including a visit with his Iranian son-in-law's family, Byrd concluded the shah had lost so much public support that pushing him to make public appearances could be counter-productive and further polarize Iranian society. Mike Willard, Byrd's press secretary, later recalled, "I was on the side of those who felt the shah was in an impossible situation and didn't feel a ringing endorsement could salvage his reign ... it might even hasten his downfall." And, he noted, "Hoyt Purvis, Byrd's chief foreign policy strategist, voiced the same opinion."
Byrd and those of us with him traveled by helicopter from the embassy to the shah's palace because the streets were unsafe and a curfew was in effect.
The palace luncheon, possibly the last such occasion for the shah, was subdued. Empress Farah spoke of her son, who was in pilot training in the United States. The shah, not surprisingly, seemed preoccupied. It wasn't known how serious his health problems were.
Byrd, in his communication with Carter after the meeting, said he thought events were rapidly approaching a climax of critical and fateful proportions and he was pessimistic about the shah's future.
The shah fled Iran Jan. 16, 1979, beginning a vagabond-like international tour. Two weeks later Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile after 15 years and soon took power. The shah died in exile in July 1980. The prior November 52 Americans were taken hostage by Islamic militants at the U.S embassy where we had stayed the previous year. They were not released until Carter was leaving office in January 1981. The events left a dark shadow on U.S. relations with Iran.
The intervening years have brought ongoing conflicts in U.S.-Iranian relations -- the Iran-Contra scandal; the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane mistaken for a military aircraft; Iran-Iraq relations; the U.S. embargo and sanctions on Iran trade; threats and counter-threats, and, of course, the "nuclear deal."
The nuclear agreement worked out by the United States, Iran and other key nations remains very much in today's news. It was seen by supporters as a promising development. However, President Trump has made clear his unalterable opposition to the agreement, which was negotiated by the Obama administration. Trump can't refer to it without using "horrible" or "terrible" as modifiers.
A leading critic of the deal, and of Iran's behavior, is Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton, who recently said the United States could win a war against Iran in "two strikes." Trump, despite his bellicosity and urging from his staff, says he doesn't want war with Iran.
Iranian officials blasted reported Trump administration plans for more arms sales and increased deployment of forces to the high-tension region, soon after he threatened that provocations from Iran would be met with "great force."
We have experienced decades of animosity and mistrust between the two nations. The course of history was making a portentous turn in those days in Iran 40 years ago. We were on the verge of significant change in international relations, and reverberations are very much with us today, long after that visit to Iran.
Commentary on 05/29/2019