Trust but … you know

Promises out of Pyongyang? Verify, verify, verify

Polonius: What do you read, my Lord?

Hamlet: Words, words, words.

THE PRESIDENT of the United States, who isn’t nuanced about much, used part of the weekend, and a couple of his many tweets, to tamper down the expectations game about North Korea: “We are a long

way from conclusion on North Korea, maybe things will work out, and maybe they won’t—only time will tell.”

That comes after Pyongyang’s announcement last week that it would freeze nuclear and ICBM tests. Experts who study the hermit kingdom, congressional leaders, and most anybody who’s been paying attention greeted the news with guarded optimism—and it was generally more guarded than optimistic.

Why? There are several reasons. Actually, several years to remember:

1992.In January of that year, governments on both sides of the 38th Parallel sign the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. By September of that year, international inspectors were already finding discrepancies on the northern side.

1993.North Korea agrees to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and “safeguards.”

Early 1994. The CIA says North Korea has produced at least one nuclear weapon.

Early 1994, again. North Korea agrees to inspections, again.

Mid 1994. North Korea pulls out of IAEA.

August 1994. The new leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Il, who comes to power after his father dies, signs an “agreed statement” to eliminate North Korean nukes. Allies agree to send North Korea supplies.

1996.North Korea preps for missile tests.

1998.North Korea’s government press, the only kind in that country, says it’ll give up missiles and testing for cash.

1999.During talks in Berlin, the north agrees to stop long range missile development and the U.S. lifts some sanctions.

2000.After some encouraging news at a North-South summit, the U.S. lifts more sanctions. North Korea says it’ll stop all missile exports for, say, a billion dollars a year.

2001.The U.S. imposes sanctions, again, because North Korea has transfered missile-related technology to Iran.

2002.North Korea starts doing missile business with Yemen, too. The U.S. announces it has discovered a secret program in Pyongyang to enrich uranium. The North announces it’s re-opening a reactor.

2003.North Korea tells Secretary of State Colin Powell that it might stop its nuclear program and missile exports for “something considerable in return.”

2005.Kim Jong Il tells China’s president it was his father’s dying wish to see the denuclearization of the peninsula. A new round of talks starts in Beijing. North Korea eventually commits “to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”

2006.North Korea tests several ballistic missiles. In October, it conducts an underground nuclear test.

You see the pattern. North Korea promises to scrap a dangerous missile or nuclear program, cool its rhetoric and agree to a treaty—all in exchange for something like fuel, supplies or cash. It receives the dane-geld. Then abandons its agreements until next time. Right now, in April 2018, it seems to be on the “play nice” swing of the pendulum. And if the West rewards that now? The recent past doesn’t provide much hope.

As Churchill once said, jaw-jaw is better than war-war. But when it comes to dealing with North Korea, no matter what Lil’ Kim may tell his press, let’s all remember, it’s only jaw-jaw. Nothing can be counted on unless it’s met with action.

Trust but verify. It’s still one of Ronald Reagan’s best pieces of advice.

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