Recounts or no, U.S. elections are still vulnerable to hacking, analysts say

In this Oct. 14, 2016 photo, a technician works to prepare voting machines to be used in the upcoming election in Philadelphia. These paperless digital voting machines, used by roughly one in five U.S. voters last month, present one of the most glaring dangers to the security of the rickety, underfunded U.S. election system. Like many electronic voting machines, they are vulnerable to hacking. But other machines typically leave a paper trail that could be manually checked.
In this Oct. 14, 2016 photo, a technician works to prepare voting machines to be used in the upcoming election in Philadelphia. These paperless digital voting machines, used by roughly one in five U.S. voters last month, present one of the most glaring dangers to the security of the rickety, underfunded U.S. election system. Like many electronic voting machines, they are vulnerable to hacking. But other machines typically leave a paper trail that could be manually checked.

ALLENTOWN, Pa. — Jill Stein's bid to recount votes in Pennsylvania was in trouble even before a federal judge shot it down Dec. 12. That's because the Green Party candidate's effort stood little chance of detecting potential fraud or error in the vote — there was basically nothing to recount.

Pennsylvania is one of 11 states where the majority of voters use antiquated machines that store votes electronically, without printed ballots or other paper-based backups that could be used to double-check the balloting. There's almost no way to know if they've accurately recorded individual votes — or if anyone tampered with the count.

More than 80 percent of Pennsylvanians who voted Nov. 8 cast their ballots on such machines, according to VotePA, a nonprofit seeking their replacement. VotePA's Marybeth Kuznik described the proposed recount this way: "You go to the computer and you say, 'OK, computer, you counted this a week-and-a-half ago. Were you right the first time?'"

Like many electronic voting machines, they are vulnerable to hacking. But other machines typically leave a paper trail that could be manually checked. The paperless digital machines open the door to potential election rigging that might not ever be detected.

"If I were going to hack this election, I would go for the paperless machines because they are so hard to check," said Barbara Simons, the co-author of Broken Ballots, a study of flawed U.S. voting technology.

Stein described her recount effort as a way to ensure that the 2016 election wasn't tainted by hacking or fraud. There's no evidence of either so far — a fact federal judge Paul Diamond cited prominently in his decision halting the Pennsylvania recount .

Stein pursued similar recounts in Wisconsin and Michigan, to little avail. Those states use more reliable paper-based voting technologies. (The Electoral College certified Donald Trump's presidential victory last week.)

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