PRESCOTT, Ariz. - A three-month investigation into the June deaths of 19 firefighters killed while battling an Arizona blaze cited poor communication between the men and support staff and revealed that an air tanker carrying flame retardant was hovering overhead as the firefighters died.
The 120-page report released Saturday found that proper procedure was followed and assigned little blame for the worst firefighting tragedy since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. All but one member of the Granite Mountain Hotshots crew died June 30 while protecting the small former gold rush town of Yarnell, about 80 miles northwest of Phoenix, from a lightning-sparked wildfire. Hotshots are highly trained backcountry firefighters who hike deep into the brush to fight blazes. While maintaining a neutral tone,the investigation cited badly programmed radios, vague updates and a 33-minute communication blackout just before the flames engulfed the men. Although the report points to multiple failures, investigators did not consider whether the deaths could have been avoided, raising questions about what lessons firefighters can take from the tragedy.
“These guys were doing what they were trained to do, and doing it well. But mother nature wins,” Jeff Berino, an incident commander in Colorado who has also worked as a fire investigator, said during a media briefing in Prescott, where all of the fallen firefighters lived.
Some family members were angered that the report didn’t draw stronger conclusions or recommend changes. David Turbyfill interrupted the news conference to shame officials for not providing his 27-year-old son Travis with the protection he needed to survive as the flames swept over him. He said the shelter Travis died in had not been improved in 13 years.
“This report is fairly conclusive that the fire sheltersare a total disaster. Policies, as they may be, need to change,” he said.
The report, produced by a team of local, state and federal fire experts, provides the first minute-to-minute account of the fatal afternoon. The day went according to routine in the boulder-strewn mountains until the wind shifted about 4 p.m., pushing a wall of fire that had been receding from the firefighters back toward them.
After that, the command center lost track of the 19 men. Without telling command, and despite the weather warning, the firefighters left the safety of a burned ridge and dropped into a densely vegetated basin surrounded by mountains on three sides. Investigators noted that the men failed to perceive the “excessive risk” of this move and said there was no way to know why the firefighters made the deadly decision.The command center thought the firefighters had decided to wait out the weather change in the safety zone.
Command did not find out the men were surrounded by flames and fighting for their lives until five minutes before they deployed their emergency shelters, which was more than a half hour after the weather warning was issued.
Without guidance from headquarters or their lookout, who had left after warning the crew, the men had bushwhacked into a canyon that soon turned into a bowl of fire. As the flames overcame the men, a large air tanker was hovering above, trying to determine their location.
The firefighters might have failed to communicate during that crucial half hour because they entered a dead zone, or because they were wary of overloading the radio channels. In the end, the same communication gaps that stymied the rescue effort hindered the reconstruction of the tragedy.
The fire destroyed more than 100 homes and burned 13 square miles before it was fully contained July 10.
Information for this article was contributed by Mike Blood and Michelle Price of The Associated Press.
Front Section, Pages 2 on 09/29/2013