North Korea’s guillotine

Astriking feature of North Korean communism has been the remarkable measure of physical security enjoyed by the uppermost reaches of the brutal and repressive regime.

To be sure, North Korean generals and other functionaries to Pyongyang’s royals have ended up in front of firing squads. But top families were exposed only sparingly to the routinized violence and terror they counted on to maintain their rule-and often transgressions that would have resulted in the ultimate sanction for commoners were pardoned or ignored for bluebloods.

This brings us to the defenestration of Jang Song Thaek, Pyongyang’s putative second in command, by Kim Jong Un, the young Dear And Respected Leader who is Kim Il Sung’s grandson and Jang’s nephew. Last Monday, before a hall packed by his Politburo comrades, a passive Jang was repeatedly denounced for “anti-party activities” and other crimes, then frog-marched out of the chamber by uniformed guards. On Thursday, North Korean media announced the execution of “traitor for all ages Jang Song Thaek.”

There are three immediate implications of this affair.

First: There is no obvious reason that a purge of the North Korean aristocracy, once begun, should necessarily end with Jang. And if it is open season on Pyongyang royals, Kim Jong Un has ample motive for doing away with a great many of his nearest and dearest.

Second, there is the potential impact on regime cohesion. Faced with the possibility of an impending reign of terror, some royals and courtiers may be so loyal as to offer themselves up on a sacrifice pyramid. But others near the pinnacle of power might interpret the Jang affair as a wake-up call: time to check bank accounts in China, to polish up damning dossiers on those who should go down before them, or even to think the unthinkable about a new and better dictator. After all, once a reign of terror gets started, ending it usually involves replacing the executioner. A concerted if concealed shift in calculations and personal survival stratagems by those at the regime’s core could have unpredictable-even destabilizing-consequences.

The third implication concerns Kim Jong Un’s judgment, or lack thereof. Does he understand the forces he may have set in play domestically? There is scant reason to accord him the benefit of the doubt.

North Korea occupies a high-tension, high stakes niche in the international system wherein there is precious little margin for error. It is incalculably dangerous to have a decider prone to miscalculations running the show. But in the regime’s next crisis, who is going to counsel the Dear And Respected Leader that his preferred option is a dumb idea? Not Uncle Jang.

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Nicholas Eberstadt holds a chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a visiting fellow at the Asan Institute in Seoul and a founding member of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

Editorial, Pages 14 on 12/17/2013

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